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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Public Service Commission of Utah (hereinafter the
"Commission") failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) (1985) in detariffing mobile radio service and
exempting the suppliers of such services from the requirement of
seeking

prior

Mountain

approval

States Telephone

NewVector Group, Inc.,
requirements
factors

for

of

were

S

rate

changes.

and Telegraph

Respondents,

Company

and U.S. West

argue that the Commission satisfied the

54-8b-3(2)

irrelevant,

when

and

that

it

determined

presentation

regarding those factors was unnecessary.

is wholly without merit.

language

expressly

S

54-8b-3(2)

enumerated therein are "relevant" —
task to redetermine that
consider the enumerated
based

on

accomplish

competent,
without

issue.

that
of

named

evidence

This interpretation of

the statutory requirements
of

the

states

that

The plain
the

factors

it is not the Commission's

Rather, the Commission

is to

factors of Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2)

admissible

requiring

evidence

presentation

--

a task

it

cannot

of evidence on those

factors.

1 The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company and U.S.
West NewVector Group, Inc. will hereinafter be referred to
respectively as "Mountain Bell" and "NewVector", or collectively
as "Respondents", since they have filed a joint brief in this
case. NewVector is actually an intervenor in this appeal.

The Commission's Finding of Fact, Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 14f 15 and 16 are not factually supported by the
record,

and cannot

standard of review.

withstand

scrutiny

under

the appropriate

Respondents erroneously conclude that each

of the findings attacked by Petitioner David Williams dba Industrial Communications ("Williams") should be upheld if supported
by "any evidence whatsoever."

The contested findings of the

Commission actually contain questions of basic fact, ultimate
fact, or both, and conclusions of law.

While the Commission's

findings on basic facts might be examined under the "any evidence
whatsoever" standard, application of the law to those facts is to
be reviewed by this Court under the intermediate standard of
"reasonableness or rationality."

In this case the Commission's

findings of fact fail to withstand scrutiny under this intermediate standard of review.
Finally, the Commission's findings are not supported by
a residuum of legally competent evidence admissible in a court of
law.

In an attempt to overcome their witnesses' reliance on

clear hearsay as the basis for their testimony before the Commission, Respondents cite for the first time exceptions to the
hearsay rule applicable to expert witnesses.

They then argue

that the witnesses not qualified as experts could have been so
qualified, and that the hearsay riddled testimony was properly
allowed.

Since the testimony of each of Respondents' witnesses

-2-

was based on hearsay and contained material facts of which they
had no personal knowledge, the findings of the Commission were
not supported by a residuum of legally competent evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN, S 54-8b-3(2).
Respondents apparently misunderstand, and as a result,

misconstrue Williams' argument in their opposing brief.
dents argue that Williams' only specific complaint

Respon-

is that the

Commission did not consider the cost of providing mobile telephone

service

as

required

by Utah

Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) (i) .

(See Brief of Respondents at 8) (hereinafter
fact,

Williams'

opening

brief

clearly

"Br. Resp.").
states

that

In
the

Commission's failure to consider "relevant factor" (i), "the cost
of providing such service" is merely an example of one of the
factors which the Commission failed to consider.
Petitioner

at

9,

13-14)

(hereinafter

(See Brief of

"Br. Pet.").

While

the

Commission may have considered some evidence (albeit incompetent)
on a few of the factors

listed

in S 54-8b-3(2),

require any evidence whatsoever on many of them.
ples of

factors

as to which

the Commission

it failed to
Further exam-

failed

to require

presentation of competent evidence include, among others: (d) the
existence
services

of

other

readily

providers

available

to make
at

functionally

competitive

rates,

equivalent
terms

and

conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on the regulated revenue
-3-

requirements of the telecommunications corporation requesting an
exemption; and (j) the economic impact on existing telecommunications corporations.

Williams maintains that the Commission must

consider each of the legislatively specified factors.

Failure to

do so constitutes reversible error.
A.

The Commission is Without Authority to
Alter or Declare Irrelevant the Requirements of S 54-8b-3(2) Established by the
Legislature.

U.C.A. S 54-8b-3(2) states in relevant part:
. . . In determining whether to exempt any
telecommunications
corporation
or
public
telecommunications service from any requirement of this title, the commission shall
consider all relevant factors including, but
not limited to: (a) the number of other
providers offering similar services; (b) the
interstate market power and market share
within the state of Utah of the telecommunications corporation requesting an exemption;
(c) the intrastate market power and market
share of other providers; (d) the existence
of other providers to make
functionally
equivalent
services
readily available at
competitive rates, terms, and conditions; (e)
the effect of exemption on the regulated
revenue requirements of the telecommunications corporation requesting an exemption;
(f) the ease of entry of other providers into
the marketplace; (g) the overall impact of
exemption on the public interest; (h) the
integrity of all service providers in the
proposed market; (i) the cost of providing
such service; (j) the economic impact on
existing telecommunication corporations; and
(k) whether competition will promote the
provision of adequate services at just and
reasonable rates. (Emphasis added).
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In its Report and Order and in their brief, the Commission

and

Respondents

argue

that

the

requirements of S 54-8b-3(2) when
factor

is relevant

presentation

of

necessary,

Commission

satisfies

it considers whether a named

to an issue before the Commission, or that

evidence

regarding

a

specific

factor

(See R. 522-23; Br. Resp. 10-11.)

completely

the

ignores

the

fact

that

the

This

Legislature

is

not

argument

has

already

determined that the factors listed in S 54-8b-3(2) are relevant
and are to be considered

by the Commission.

The

Legislature

stated that "the Commission shall consider all relevant factors
including, but not limited to: . . . "
The

Commission

is

totally

without

factors (a) through (k) .
legislative

authority

to

rewrite the statutory requirements of S 54-8b-3(2) by declaring
"irrelevant"
deemed

the

relevant

Respondents1

factors
and

argument

which

the

commanded
that

the

Legislature

has

expressly

Commission

to

consider.

"[t]he

Commission

interpreted

S 54-8b-3(2) to mean that it must consider the enumerated issues
in reaching

its decision, but that

it did not need to receive

specific evidence on each enumerated factor" reduces the mandatory language of S 54-8b-3(2) and factors (a) - (k) to a nullity.
(Br. Resp. 11-12.)
Further,

Respondents'

argument

that

requiring

the

Commission to consider evidence on each of the enumerated factors
in

S

54-8b-3(2)

would

"eliminate

-5-

the

Commission's

power,

as

permitted by this Court, to use its technical sophistication to
determine

whether

a factor

given case" is without merit.

is relevant

or determinative

(Br. Resp. 13.)

in a

The Legislature,

in enacting S 54-8b-3(2), established a clear and concise procedure to be followed by the Commission

in determining whether to

exempt any telecommunications corporation or any public telecommunications service from any requirement of Title 54.

Requiring

the Commission

does not

"eliminate

to follow

the Legislature's procedure

the Commission's

power" but

rather

establishes

the

parameters within which the Commission may properly exercise its
power.
B.

The Commission Erred by Not Requiring
Evidence Relevant to the Factors Listed
in S 54-8b-3(2).

Respondents

argue

that

the

Commission

adequately

considered the cost of providing mobile telephone service.
Br. Resp. 13-15.)

However,

Respondents do not

cite

(See

(nor can

they) any portion of the record containing any evidence regarding
specific cost data.

Instead, Respondents argue that "counsel for

[Williams] requested information concerning, not Mountain Bell's
2
mobile telephone cost, but its profitability."
(Br. Resp, 15

2 Respondents argument that Williams was reluctant to pursue
the issue of cost on cross-examination due to a concern that it
might be called upon to respond in kind (Br. Resp. 16) is incorrect and wholly unsupported by the record.
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citing R. 98.)

Respondents, in making this argument, failed to

recognize three things:
as

the

applicant

concerning

the

First, the burden is upon Mountain Bell,

before

factors

the

listed

Commission,
in

S

to

provide

54-8b-3(2),

and

Williams to demand such evidence on cross examination.

evidence
not

upon

Second,

Industrial's request for profitability data necessarily included
a

request

require

for

such

cost
a

data,

showing.

since

profitability

Finally,

evidence

profitability

is

would

another

enumerated factor, independent of cost, as to which the Commission failed to require, and Mountain Bell failed to offer, any
evidence.
II.

Utah Code Ann, S 54-8b-3(2)(e).
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 2, 3,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16 ARE NOT
FACTUALLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
Respondents

argue

that

this Court's

opinion

in Utah

Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission

658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) ["Wexpro II"] requires that this

Court review each of the Commission's contested findings of fact
under the "any evidence whatsoever" standard.
supports
fact

Williams'

argument

that

In fact, Wexpro II

the Commission's

in this case should be scrutinized

under an

findings of
intermediate

"substantial evidence" or "reasonableness or rationality" standard.
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A.

The Appropriate Standard of Review of
the Contested Findings of Fact in this
Case is "Reasonableness or Rationality."

In Wexpro II, this Court established that in reviewing
the Commission's interpretations of general questions of law, the
standard to be applied

is "correction of error."

Id.

at 608.

Under this standard, no deference is given to the expertise of
the Commission.

Id.

At the other end of the spectrum, Wexpro II

establishes that "[t]he greatest degree of deference is extended
to the Commission's findings on questions of basic fact which do
not include 'ultimate facts' and the application of legal rules
to basic facts . . . "

id. (parenthesis omitted).

The standard to be applied in this case was described
by the Court as follows:
Between the foregoing extremes of no deference on questions of general law and the
greatest deference on questions of basic fact
are a variety of issues on which Commission
decisions are entitled to weight, but are
subject to judicial review to assure that
they fall within the limits of reasonableness
or rationality.
The existence of this
intermediate category of issues is a pragmatic concern -- borne of experience — that
the terms law
and fact and the extent of
judicial review associated with them have not
provided the analytical framework to explain
the various types of review actually exercised by the courts. As Judge Henry Friendly
has said, 'The common approach seeking to
dichotomize all decisions as either "law" or
"fact"
is
too
simplistic'
(citation
omitted). . . [P]ractical experience with
judicial review has unquestionably identified
a major category of administrative decisions
on which reviewing courts exercise a scope of
review more extensive than when reviewing

-8-

agency findings on questions of basic fact,
but less extensive than when reviewing to
correct error in agency decisions on questions of general law. (citation omitted).
A variety of different issues are governed by
this intermediate standard.
Most notably,
they include what has been described as
'mixed questions of law and fact1 or the
'application' of the findings of basic facts
(e.g., what happened) to the legal rules
governing the case. . . .
Also among these intermediate issues are the
Commission's decisions on what can be called
questions of "special law".
These are the
Commission's interpretations of the operative
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer, especially those generalized terms that bespeak a legislative intent
to delegate their interpretation to the
responsible agency. . . . [0]n issues of
special law, as with other issues under this
heading, the decision of the Commission is
subject to judicial review under the standard
lucidated here.
The degree of deference extended to the
decisions of the Commission on these intermediate types of issues has been given various
expressions, but all are variations of the
idea that the Commission's decisions must
fall within the limits of reasonableness or
rationality.
As used in this context, the
words 'arbitrary and capricious' mean no more
than this.
The test of rationality may be simply a
matter of logic or completeness, such as when
the question is whether the Commission's
findings of fact support its conclusion,
(citing Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Utah Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d
1047, 1057 (1981)).
658 P.2d at 609-11 (emphasis added).
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In their brief, Respondents are apparently taking the
position that the challenged findings are all basic findings of
fact.

(Br. Resp. 20.)

In reality, each of the challenged

findings of fact contain basic facts, ultimate facts, or both,
and represent an analysis by the Commission of these facts within
the framework of Utah Code Ann, S 54-8b-3(2).

As such, each of

the contested findings of fact represents a "mixed question of
law and fact" as explained

in Wexpro II.

Thus, under this

Court's decision in Wexpro II, each of the contested findings of
fact is to be examined under an intermediate standard of review
requiring that "the Commission's decisions must fall within the
limits of

reasonableness or rationality."

658 P.2d

at 610.

Respondents' argument that each of the contested findings of fact
is to be reviewed under the standard of "evidence of any substance whatever" is simply without merit.
B.

The Commission's Findings Fail to Withstand Scrutiny Under the Appropriate
Standard of Review.

As this Court recognized in Wexpro II, the intermediate
standard of review "has been given various expressions, but all
are variations of the idea that the Commission's decisions must
fall within the limits of reasonableness or rationality."

658

P.2d at 610. One of the expressions of the intermediate standard
of review referred to in Wexpro

II is contained

in Mountain

States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, 636

-10-

P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), cited in Williams' opening brief.

Accord-

ing to the Court in that case,
For this court to sustain an order, the
findings must be sufficiently detailed to
demonstrate that the Commission has properly
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and
has properly applied the governing rules of
law to those findings. Ultimate findings as
to reasonableness and discrimination must be
sustained if there are adequate subordinate
findings to support them, and there is
substantial evidence to support the findings,
636 P.2d at 1052.

Under this "substantial evidence" expression

of the intermediate standard of review, the Commission's findings
of fact in this case do not withstand scrutiny.

As detailed in

Williams' original brief, Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 14, 15 and 16 are unsupported by "substantial evidence"
and are erroneous as a matter of law.
Respondents

argue

that

(Br. Pet. 18-23.)

the Commission's

finding

that

various providers offer functionally equivalent mobile telephone
service

is supported by the evidence

Williams
"obviously
could

misinterprets
contemplates

be provided

tions."

at

S

54-8b-3(2)(d)

that

because

functionally

non-competitive

(Br. Resp. 21.)

(Br. Resp. 20), and that

equivalent

rates,

Respondents

that

terms

section
services

and

condi-

fail to explain how an

equivalent service could be "equivalent" without being offered at
competitive rates, terms and conditions.
any service offered

at non-competitive

Williams asserts that
rates, dissimilar

terms

and dissimilar conditions is, by definition, not an "equivalent
-11-

service."
evidence

In

addition,

in the record"

Respondents
indicates

that

argue

that

"substantial

functionally

equivalent

services are available, but fail to identify that evidence.
Resp. 21.)

(Br.

In fact, the only evidence in the record which could

even arguably be relevant to the question of functionally equivalent services is based on hearsay, and as such cannot be the sole
basis supporting a finding.
III. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY A RESIDUUM OF LEGALLY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
In Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339
P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959), this Court established that Commission findings of fact cannot be based solely upon hearsay, but
must be "'supported by a residuum of legal evidence competent in
a court of law.f"

Id. quoting Ogden

Iron Works v. Industrial

Comm. , 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376, 377 (1942), and cases cited
therein.

See also, Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481,

486 (Utah 1981).

In other words, the Commission's findings can

only be upheld on judicial review if they are based on a residumm
or balance of competent

evidence above and beyond

the hearsay

testimony presented.
In an effort to overcome the implications of this rule,
Respondents

assert

that

"Messrs.

Murphy

and

Capshaw

and

Dr.

Compton were qualified as experts and could have been formally so
qualified had Williams objected to their opinion testimony on the
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ground that they were not experts."

(Br. Resp. 35.)

Counsel for

Williams in fact made numerous objections to the admissibility of
the hearsay testimony offered.
107,

117.)

Division

(R. 62, 83-84, 94, 95, 102, 106,

witnesses

Robert

Capshaw

and

George

R.

Compton admitted during cross-examination before the Commission
that they relied upon documents provide by Mr. Murphy, for which
there was no foundation whatsoever, in preparing their testimony
and formulating their opinions.
numerous

objections

made

by

(R. at 160, 204.)
Williams'

counsel,

Despite the
counsel

for

Respondents did not attempt to qualify the witnesses as experts.
Instead, Respondents have waited until this late date to assert
that the hearsay testimony offered by the witnesses was competent
and admissible as the proper basis for expert opinions.
dents,

not

Williams

(who

raised

proper

hearsay

Respon-

objections)

assumes the risk of error when the Commission erroneously allows
and

considers

thereon.

inadmissible

evidence

and

bases

its

finding

The time to cure evidentiary errors is now past.
In

summary,

the

testimony

offered

by

each

of

the

witnesses for the Respondents constituted hearsay and was inadmissible.

Thus, the Commission's findings are unsupported by a

residuum of competent evidence.
CONCLUSION
In Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 770
P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), this Court declared that the Commission is
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bound by the statutory directives under which it acts, and cannot
ignore the requirements of those statutes when exempting telecommunications services from regulation.
cannot circumvent

A fortiori, the Commission

the legislatively pronounced scheme of Utah

Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) by declaring its mandated considerations
irrelevant.

For this reason, and for others stated above and in

Williams' opening brief, the Report
Commission

in consolidated

and Order

case nos. 85-049-09

issued by the
and 85-999-19

should be vacated.
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